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Dear

After my overly optimistic letter of April I discovered that I did not have sufficient materials with me in Italy to put together, even fairly sensibly, some idea of the requirements which you had suggested I send on to you.

They therefore had to await my return here, after finishing the book there, and some reading before I could put together the enclosed. I would like to draw your attention especially to the third paragraph on the first page - which describes the situation surrounding any effort to list "requirements" for this kind of a work. However, I think you appreciate fully the problems involved, i.e., no one person knows what exists on the subject - I least of all.

To have finished in Italy is a true delight.

It is my present plan to go to the States some time in August, after ~~fix~~ doing the introductory, historical part of this book - although I shall, of course, adapt my schedule to what your people may be able to do. (If I were to go to New York the first week of August, my guess has been that New York and Washington would both involve, altogether, five or six weeks.)

Meanwhile, I have had very distressing news about your friend on P Street, and I would also like a brief moment with you on another matter. I'll be in town next week - around Wednesday or Thursday - and as soon as I know when I'll give your office a buzz to arrange a convenient time.

Perhaps a light summer (sic!) libation?

With best wishes -
John

Historical Material for Study of Hungarian Revolution of 1956:

This study is, as it was originally described to the publishers, an attempt "to produce the definitive work to date on the subject - insofar as this is possible at this stage....No one has yet tried to place the event in perspective and to clear up some of the still unresolved questions. That may not be completely possible yet, and may never be, but it seemsthat a valuable, even outstanding, start could be made."

The major question still unresolved is, of course, the background and facts of the Russian decision to suppress the Revolution by force. There are also other questions, however, on which additional light would help to put the Revolution in its larger historical perspective - this being the principal theme of the book. Such questions concern the reactions in the other Eastern European states, and in Western Europe. By "reactions" I mean official policy decisions as well as popular response.

As I obviously do not know, except for a few isolated instances, exactly what material is available - and particularly what has become available, through defections or other sources, in the nearly nine years since the Revolution - the best method has seemed to be to list the principal categories of information which would be useful. There are six of these, covering the geographical areas. I have tried to describe these by explanations or references to specific questions, as examples of the kind of information needed. My needs, of course, are by no means limited to these particular examples.

While solid information is the greatest need, informed speculation would also be valuable.

I - The Soviet Union:

- 1 - Material bearing on the timing of the final Soviet decision.
- 2 - Material bearing on the reasons for the Soviet decision.
- 3 - Material identifying the divisions of opinion within the Soviet leadership on how to handle the Hungarian outbreak.
- 4 - Material concerning what transpired during the Mikoyan-Suslov visits to Budapest, October 24-25, and October 30-31.
- 5.- Rakosi had been shipped off to the Soviet Union in July; Gerö was sent off on October 24, reportedly by Suslov and Mikoyan. On November 27 the Nepakarat ran an item about Rakosi being a frequent guest at the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow. Is there any evidence showing, or suggesting, that Rakosi and Gerö played an active role in the Soviet decision on Hungary? (Beyond, of course, the obvious supposition as to what their advice would have been, if asked.)
- 6 - Specific, confirmed accounts of desertions of Red Army troops in Hungary, or of their rendering assistance to Hungarian fighters.

7 - There are reports alleging the existence of a document taken by Hungarian Army men or Freedom Fighters from a "captured" Senior Russian officer instructing Soviet forces to retreat if confronted with American forces, and not to fire on American aircraft over Hungary. Is there anything corresponding to such a document, or confirming such instructions to Red Army units in Hungary?

8 - Confirmation of the numerous stories of Red Army troops having been told they were fighting - variously - "West German fascists in East Germany", "American and English imperialists in Hungary," or "Franco-British imperialists in Egypt."

II - China:

1 - For the first five days after October 23 Peking maintained silence about events in Hungary, then was relatively non-committal, and then, about November 1, began to condemn the Nagy Government, ending in vigorous support of the Soviet intervention of November 4. At the time of the uprising the Hungarian Communists counted much on Chinese support for their cause - as had the Poles during their own ~~anti-imperialist~~ crisis - and seemed, from published statements, to be under the impression that they were receiving it. However, in the summer of 1963 Peking, in one of its blasts at Moscow and Khrushchev, alleged that the Soviet leadership had been prepared to concede the day in Hungary in 1956, and had only followed the correct course of suppressing the revolt after having been, in effect, pushed to it by Peking. Is there any material showing the true role of Peking in the affair?

III - The Satellites:

1 - In general, very useful material on the satellites in this period (and some on the Soviet Union) is to be found in the reports of the Office of the Political Advisor of RFE at Munich for all of 1956 and the first six months of 1957, if these could be made available. (Griffith, Ritvo, et al.)

2 - Are there any authoritative and usable - accounts of deliberations in the Politburos, or CP leaderships generally, of the satellites showing indecision, divisions, or a desire to profit from the disarray in the Soviet Empire brought on by the Hungarians?

3 - Czechoslovakia:

a - Evidence of Czech demands on Moscow for economic concessions from the Soviet Union during the first week of the Hungarian uprising. (In 1957 I obtained a document - via the Hungarian Legation in Paris, as I recall - containing a list of demands by the Czechs on Moscow dated October 29, 1956 - the quid pro quo unmentioned, but assumed to be Czech support against the Hungarians - plus a document showing assessments throughout the Soviet bloc during 1957 for reconstruction of Hungary, in which the Czechs were saddled with extra-heavy burdens.)

b - Evidence of occupation by Czechoslovak troops, during the fighting in Hungary, of the five villages on the south bank of the Danube opposite Bratislava, ceded to Czechoslovakia by the Hungarian Peace Treaty of 1947, and known as the "Bratislava bridgehead."

c - Evidence of invasion of Hungarian territory by Czechoslovak troops during the fighting in Hungary. (Reports of such incursions

usually mention no actual fighting with the Hungarians, but place them around Komarom following the second Russian attack.)

d - Evidence of passage of Soviet troops through Czechoslovakia to Hungary. (Mentioned in some reports, but not making a great deal of military or geographical sense in the actual circumstances.)

e - Confirmation of reports that the initial broadcasts of the Kadar Government on November 4 - and for a short time thereafter - came from transmitters on Czechoslovak territory.

4 - Rumania:

a - Is there any confirmation of the widespread reports that "the Rumanian Army was disarmed" during the period ~~mixx~~ of the Hungarian uprising?

IV - Yugoslavia:

1 - Is there any evidence of Yugoslav involvement in the Hungarian events beyond the doctrinal disputes with the Soviet leadership (and, after the Crimea talks of September, 1956, with the Hungarian leadership, including Kadar, at Belgrade in October) over "different paths to socialism?" In short, is there any evidence that Yugoslav activity in Hungary went beyond high-level CP discussions to embrace any form of agitation, recruitment, or organization?

2 - Is there any information as to the advice, if any, proffered in confidence by the Yugoslavs to Nagy, his collaborators, and to the Hungarian CP, during the period October 24 to November 4?

3 - Is there any evidence of Yugoslav foreknowledge (other than what any observer on the scene could have expected from Soviet behavior and troop movements) of the Soviet attack of November 4? (Cf. the accounts of Yugoslav invitation to Nagy and others to take refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy prior to Soviet attack during night of November 3-4, and allegation by correspondent of East German ADN that his report of changes in Hungarian Government of November 3 was edited in East Berlin on same day to delete name of Kadar.)

4 - On November 11, seven days after the second Soviet attack, Tito gave his well-known speech at Pula, in which he strongly criticized Imre Nagy (who was still under asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest) and took a strong position in favor of Kadar (who had been Minister of the Interior at the time of the Rajk trial.) Is there any information showing or suggesting that this was something more than realpolitik with a vengeance - that there was any link of a special nature between the Yugoslav leadership and Kadar?

V - Hungary:

1 - Is there a reliable, authoritative account of the original calling in of Soviet troops? (The majority of accounts seem to agree that it was Hegedus who actually made the request, with the assent of Gerö, and seem to suggest that the request was made to the Soviet Embassy in Budapest - with a remarkably quick response. This doesn't jibe with usual Soviet, or even satellite, practice. I may be wrong, but to me it is inconceivable that Gerö did not have a direct line to Moscow - to whoever in the Soviet Praesidium was his protector - and would not have used it, bypassing the Soviet Ambassador, in a matter of such gravity. Later

Russian backing of Gerö's plot to discredit Nagy by placing the responsibility for the request on him, even after Gerö's removal to the Soviet Union, would suggest a greater degree of initial, active collusion between the Hungarian Stalinists and their protectors in the Soviet Praesidium than the generally accepted accounts reveal.)

2 - Biographical information concerning Jozsef Dudas. Information concerning his activities during the uprising, his arrest and execution, and estimates of his purposes.

3 - Has any information become available since 1956 which casts light on the hidden series of events culminating in Kadar's and Munnich's disappearance on the evening of Thursday, November 1, and what transpired between them and the Russians during the subsequent 48 hours? Anything indicating who dealt with whom, and what pressures - if any - were exerted on Kadar by the Russians?

4 - Is there any confirmation of the story that it was Serov who arrested Maléter and the Hungarian negotiators on the night of November 3-4?

5 - A list of foreign, particularly Western, diplomatic personnel in Budapest during the Revolution.

6 - Any information on the abduction of Nagy and the others on their leaving the Yugoslav Embassy on November 23, on their detention, treatment and interrogation thereafter, and on their trials.

VI - The West:

1 - Are any accounts available of Cabinet deliberations or decisions in Western European countries concerning what steps to take in the Hungarian affair?

2 - Any information concerning reported attempts of former Hungarian fascists or army officers (presumably members of the Farkas-Zako factions in Germany) to return to Hungary during the uprising? (I would like to pin down the story - told and retold in many versions - of the "man in a leather coat" at or near Győr "reconnoitering for the SS.")

3 - Any accounts of return to Hungary of non-extremist Hungarian exiles during the uprising. (Baron Radvanszky returned - but as an Austrian journalist, with an Austrian passport. However, Arpad Raksanyi - an exile in Paris who did not have French citizenship - afterwards claimed that he was sent by the Italian Christian Democratic Party to Budapest where, he alleged, he was briefly named an Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office after having spoken with the Cardinal.)

4 - Information concerning the special frontier zone claimed to have been created by the Austrian Government, which was the subject of an aide-memoire reported by the Budapest Radio to have been given to Imre Nagy by Austrian Minister in Budapest on the afternoon of November 3. (This "aide-memoire" refers to an inspection of the border area in Austria by the military attachés of the US, UK, France and USSR, and implies that the expulsion of former Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy from Austria, following his arrival in Vienna on October 29, was an Austrian initiative - although Ferenc Nagy was told by the Austrian authorities who deported him that the initiative was that of the American Ambassador.)

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5 - The story of the shipment of arms and ammunition by Zurich students to Hungary in Red Cross ambulances and trucks, its discovery after the second Russian attack, and the negotiations which followed with the Hungarian (or Russian?) authorities.